Humanists, I take it, value people, and are willing to weigh their suggestions and beliefs, giving some potential credence to any, as yet unfamiliar, belief, just from the fact that some people hold to it.
So, as a humanist, I may consider Platonism, formalism and constructivism, all views of mathematics which are held by thoughtful and scholarly people. My mathematical instinct to mark these views correct or mistaken should perhaps be held in check, since I am looking not at mathematical propositions, but at perspectives, views and beliefs. These perspectives may be valid at different times of the day! My day begins with teaching. In the classroom there are pupils and myself. Here I am a constructivist. My pupils have come to learn mathematics. I am here to speak, to question, to write and act in such a way that as much mathematical thinking and knowing goes on as possible. I may exaggerate, tell jokes, deviate from a deductive sequence, perform a drama or an experiment, whatever, so long as these contribute to the pupils' construction of mathematics. Whatever mistakes they make afterwards are in some degree my responsibility, reflecting the emphasis or lack of emphasis I have generated.
When the lesson is over I return to my office and try reading about the history of the mathematics I have just taught. I would like to be a constuctivist in this mode too, but the secondary history texts tend to focus on the achievements of past mathematicians, not upon the process by which those achievements were attained, and I am regularly frustrated.
I turn then to my research on when a binary operation has the left inverse property that ab = 1 => a(bc) = c, a weak form of the associative law. I look through a catalogue of loops of order 6. Very few of these objects relate to other parts of mathematics. For the most part I seem to be indulging in a "meaningless game played with meaningless marks on paper" (Hilbert) and confirming the formalist stance. The theorems that emerge may become useful at some time in the future, but the satisfaction I have now does not depend on that. But I am a geometer and owe so much to Hilbert. His replacement of "points, lines and planes" by "tables, chairs and beer mats" was the psychological device that let him identify unstated assumptions in our geometrical language and produce his Foundations of Geometry (1899). Formalism can be both useful and functional. Now I am a grandparent, and watch grandchildren acquiring language. I see the beginnings of counting not with the comparison of sets, but with the recitation of an almost senseless rhyme:
One, two, three four five, Once I caught a fish alive. Six, seven, eight nine ten, Then I let it go again.
Just getting used to this sequence of sounds provides the equipment for future mathematics. Formalism seems to be part of the story from a very early age!
I wonder sometimes what is going on when I subtract, say, two 4-digit numbers. There is a routine, which has become second nature, a process which I apply. If the process is to be effective it is best not to relapse into thinking what it means.
After the research interval I go to the coffee room and meet non-mathematical colleagues. The post-modernists are curious about mathematics. I tell them it is fashionable to knock Platonism these days, and they respond by asking whether there are historically or anthropologically inconsistent versions of mathematics available. I tell them that each of the versions of mathematics I am aware of can be understood as containing or being contained in some other version, and they return to their work having convinced themselves that the subject is absolute. Then I reflect back to my Press, 1989), 236-252. 27 In "Mathematical Education and Democracy," Skovsmose discusses the seeming contradiction between teaching based on students' interests and teaching based on the democratic imperative. 28 Tate, "Mathematizing and the Democracy." 29 The statistics unit described was designed in collaboration with Bill Rosenthal. The collaboration was part of our ongoing efforts to understand how to best bridge the divide between criticallyoriented university academics and progressive classroom teachers. 30 Refutations, Lakatos (1976) documents the wavering which may take place. He says we never know whether our proofs are right, but he believes we can be sure of their improvement. And what of Gödel? Undecidability promises that we will never come to the end of our search, because the choice amongst the undecidables will remain, and the absence of a consistency proof is the guarantee that shadows, not ultimates, are what we see. I think I am a Platonist at night.
